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This paper analyses the retail prices of champagnes sold in the Scandinavian countries. Price data 
for the champagnes contain nearly 380 observations including a range of quality attributes of each 
champagne. The empirical part of the analysis reveals that the retail prices of champagne can be 
fairly well explained by a hedonic price function with a degree of explanation corresponding to 
approximately 60 per cent. However the ratings by the wine experts, in this case Robert Parker, 
Wine Spectator and to a lesser extent the French ‘1855 Notation’, do just as well in terms of 
explaining the retail prices of champagnes. Especially the rating of champagnes by Robert Parker 
seems to be the most influential concerning the sales prices. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This analysis deals with the retail prices of champagne sold on the Scandinavian markets. The 
markets for champagne in these countries are rather small, of course, although the consumption of 
still wines have increased relatively fast during the last decades. A large number of French 
champagnes are available to the Scandinavian consumers, but there seems to be less price 
competition in the market concerning champagne as compared to still wine. The demand for 
champagne is most likely less price sensitive as it is usually perceived as a luxury good which to a 
large extent is bought on special occasions like weddings, New Years Eve, etc. Thus, the demand 
must be assumed to be price inelastic but of course the prices must be assumed to reflect the 
underlying quality of the champagnes. However, because champagne is bought with low frequency 
many consumers most likely do not have or seek full information on the champagne. Some 
consumers rely on the reputation of particular brands, e.g. ‘Les Grandes Marques’, some consumers 
choose to gain information from sensory ratings of champagne, e.g. Robert Parker and Wine 
Spectator. In fact, the majority of champagne dealers use points given by Parker and Wine 
Spectator in their advertising information of champagne. Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to 
analyse the formation of champagne prices on the Scandinavian markets by applying a hedonic 
price function – which is also compared to the ratings of Robert Parker, Wine Spectator and the 
French ‘1855 Notation’. In order to address this question champagne prices at the retail level in the 
Scandinavian countries have been collected along with a whole range of ‘quality attributes’ for 
these wines. Overall, the data set includes approximately 350 observations representing the main 
champagne producers and covering all three Scandinavian countries reasonably well. 
 
The analysis reveals that the prices of champagne can be fairly well explained by a hedonic price 
function including a set of quality attributes, but also the ratings by the wine expert tasters do 
correspond rather closely to the retail prices of champagnes. These findings are also in accordance 
with the majority of the empirical literature on hedonic price functions for still wines, see section 3. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a short description of recent developments in the 
consumption of sparkling wines in the Scandinavian countries. In section 3 the data are presented 
along a hedonic price function, and the hypotheses to be tested are also presented. Section 4 reports 
the empirical estimates and results from the statistical models of champagne prices, and in section 5   3
similar techniques are used in order to evaluate the ratings from the wine expert tasters, also in 
relation to prices. Finally, section 6 concludes.    
 
2. Trends in the Scandinavian markets for sparkling wine 
 
Until the late 1960s wine consumption was very modest in all of the Scandinavian countries but 
since then relatively strong increases in the sales of wines have occurred and thus, the present level 
of per capita intake of wine is more similar or closer to the consumption levels found in other 
European countries. 
 
Especially for Denmark many consumers consider wine as a regular consumer good and the annual 
level of wine consumption among the adult population (15+ years) is close to 40 litres. The 
closeness of Denmark to continental Europe has probably influenced the Danish alcohol policy, e.g. 
with lower alcohol taxes as the country had to adjust to especially the German standards and the 
trade liberalization process in the EU, which all influenced positively on the increasing market and 
sales of wines in Denmark during the last decades.  Contrary to this, Norway has never been a 
member of the EU – Sweden joined the EU in 1995 – and both countries have adhered to restrictive 
alcohol policies and still maintain a state monopoly in the retail sales of alcohol. The levels of per 
capita wine consumption for the adult population is around 25 litres and 15 litres in Sweden and 
Norway, respectively. 
 
Although the level of wine consumption may be relatively high, especially in Denmark, most of the 
sales are still wines and only a tiny fraction is champagne or sparkling wines – enjoyed at special 
occasions and therefore not part of the ‘regular’ pattern of wine consumption. In the alcohol 
statistics from the Scandinavian countries data for the sales or consumption of champagne is not 
available – and in case information can be found, champagne is often part of an aggregate 
denominated ‘sparkling wines’, i.e. sparkling wines from other countries than France are included. 
From the EUROSTAT trade statistics data for the export from France of ‘sparkling wines’ – to the 
Scandinavian countries – is available. Thus, more than champagne is included, but as it is the 
specific French export it must be expected to be primarily champagnes. Additionally, champagne 
might also be exported to the Scandinavian countries via other countries and in this case the data for   4
the French export statistics will be biased downwards – but overall, the information in the 
EUROSTAT trade statistics are assumed to be the best estimate of the amounts of champagnes 
consumed at the Scandinavian markets. Figure 1 exhibits the total quantities of French sparkling 
wines exported to the Scandinavian countries. 
 
Figure 1. Export of sparkling wines from France to Scandinavia (Monthly data, 1000 litres). 
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Source: EUROSTAT, External Trade (SITC 11215, ‘Sparkling wines’), April 2007.       
 
The total amount of French export of sparkling wines (both Cremant and champagne) to 
Scandinavia is approximately 250.000 litres per month during the last decade – with a significant 
‘bubble’ around 1999/2000. As the total population in these countries is 18 million people the 
average annual consumption level is only a few glasses of champagne! EUROSTAT also provides 
information on export values and hence, the average, whole-sale prices of sparkling wines can be 
calculated, and they are exhibited in figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Average prices of French sparkling wines exported to Scandinavia (€ per litre). 
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Source: EUROSTAT, External Trade (SITC 11215, ‘Sparkling wines’), April 2007. 
 
The average prices from figure 2 reveal that especially for Sweden there seems to be a trend 
towards consuming the more expensive champagnes – compared to Denmark and Norway – with an 
average price level of 15 € per litre from 2000 and onwards. The prices in figure 2 represent the 
values obtained by the French wine exporters and thus, the final retail prices in Scandinavia will be 
considerably higher due to transport costs, mark-ups in the retail distribution system and taxes. 
Especially for wine taxes, huge differences still exist among the Scandinavian countries, see table 1 
where the present level of wine taxation is reported.  
 
For champagnes, the general wine taxes apply, except for Denmark, where an additional tax is 
added to all sparkling wines. Wine taxes depend on the content of alcohol, especially in Norway, 
where the tax is a direct linear function of the volume of alcohol, and for a bottle of champagne (12 
% alc. vol.) the tax rate varies pretty much as revealed in the last column of table 1. Although the 
excise on champagne is four times as high in Norway as in Denmark, these taxes only represent a 
relatively small fraction of the final retail prices of champagnes in Scandinavia. The whole-sale   6
prices from figure 2 were found to be in the range of 10-15 € per litre and hence, the excises 
correspond to less that half of this level. 
 
Table 1. Wine taxes in Scandinavia, 2006-7 (excl. VAT). 
 
 
Alcohol (volume)  Tax per litre (€) 
Tax per bottle (€) 
(0.75 litre, 12%) 
Denmark:  ] 6%; 15% ]  0.82   
  ] 15%; 22% ]  1.23   
  If sparkling wine add:  0.41  0.93 
Sweden:  ] 8.5%; 15% ]  2.38   
  ] 15%; 18% ]  4.87  1.78 
Norway: 10%  4.61   
 12%  5.54   
 14%  6.46  4.16 
Notes: The wine tax rates are identical for 2006 and 2007 and converted from national currencies to € in the table using 
the official exchange rates of April 2007: 7.456 (DKK), 9.2826 (SEK) and 8.1060 (NOK). For sparkling wine there is 
an extra tax in Denmark, which must be added to the regular wine tax. In Norway the wine tax is 3.74 NOK per % 
alcohol volume per litre which is used for calculating the three cases in the table. The value added tax (VAT) is 25 per 
cent for all the countries and VAT is not included in the specific wine taxes exhibited. 
 
 
3. Modeling champagne prices 
 
According to the previous section the consumption of champagne is rather modest as compared to 
still wine on the Scandinavian markets. The normal procedure to model wine prices is to set up a 
hedonic price function assuming that consumers pay attention to all relevant product attributes in 
their buying decision. Noting that there may be an identification problem
1 (the prices are not 
necessarily equilibrium prices reflecting the embodied attributes of the good because they 
potentially reflect both demand and supply factors) the basic idea is that the buying price reflects all 
relevant characteristics included in the wine. The hedonic price function approach is commonly 
                                                 
1 ARGUEA & HSIAO (1993)   7
used on still wines, see e.g. SCHAMEL (2000, 2003), COMBRIS et al. (1997), LANDON and SMITH 
(1998), OCZKOWSKI (2001), SCHAMEL  &  ANDERSON (2003) and BENTZEN and SMITH (2006). 
Regional reputation has important influence on prices of Bordeaux wines, see LANDON & SMITH 
(1998). SCHAMEL (2000) also finds that the reputation of the region and the individual quality 
indicator of the wine (awards) are significant factors influencing the prices of Californian red wines. 
In a similar analysis of wines from Australia and New Zealand SCHAMEL & ANDERSON (2003) 
stress the importance of regional reputation and sensory quality rating of both the wine and the 
producers. Focusing on German wines SCHAMEL (2003) finds that sensory quality ratings, the 
German ‘compulsory system’, i.e. a precise quality category (the degree of ripeness of the grapes at 
harvest must be printed on the label), the sweetness of the wine and region where the wine comes 
from are all essential factors concerning the price. This result is confirmed by BENTZEN & SMITH 
(2006), who focus on the prices of German wines on the Scandinavian markets. In addition, they 
find that producer reputation and producer size affect prices positively, and that lower yield (hl/ha) 
has a significant positive influence on price. LECOCQ & VISSER (2006) use two data sets for 
Bordeaux wines and one for Burgundy wines to analyse the influence of objective characteristics 
and sensory ratings on wine prices. Characteristics of the wine appearing on the label of the bottle 
(ranking, vintage and ‘appellation’) are found to be the most important factors for prices whereas 
sensory variables only play a minor role.  
 
Focusing on consumer’s valuation of champagne COMBRIS ET AL. (2006) find that consumers are 
unable to classify low price, medium price and Grand Marques champagnes in blind test 
experiments. However, when revealing sensory and commercial information to the participants, 
brands and reputation are found to have a decisive impact on the reservation prices, though 
consumers’ preferences are still heterogeneous, see also LANGE ET AL. (2002) for similar results.   
 
Hence, characteristics that can be seen from inspection of the bottle, e.g. regional reputation, 
producer reputation, vintage, quality rankings etc. seem to be decisive in explaining wine prices in 
several studies, whereas the empirical evidence is mixed concerning the influence of expert ratings 
on consumers’ reservation prices.   
 
In line with the above-mentioned studies this paper focuses on objective characteristics and sensory 
ratings as potential key factors when explaining champagne prices on the Scandinavian markets.   8
Noting that wine taxes are different we control for country specific effects in the analysis and 
expect champagne to be cheapest in Denmark due to the free market sales system and lower taxes. 




Champagne prices are analysed in alternative model specifications, see equation (1)–(4). The first 
model is very simple using only various sensory ratings as explanatory variables. Naturally, the 
parameter for the ratings (β) is expected to be positive.  
 
 (1)  log( ) int price po s DK SW α βγ δ ε =+⋅ + ⋅ +⋅ +  
 
As noted above, we use three alternative ratings, i.e. Robert Parker, Wine Spectator and the French 
website ’1855.com’. The influence of sensory ratings on price potentially comes from different 
sources. In a market oriented system like the Danish both demand and supply may be affected by 
expert ratings, i.e. both consumers and retailers act according to their knowledge of the ratings. In 
the short run ratings may be reflected in supply prices in Norway and Sweden, i.e. prices are set by 
the state controlled firms – Vinmonopolet and Systembolaget. Of course in the longer run demand 
conditions also affect prices as consumers may not be willing to pay unrealistically high prices for 
champagnes with a low rating. 
 
In equation (2) sensory ratings are ignored and champagne prices are instead explained by objective 
characteristics and tasting attributes. 
 
(2)
log( ) ( ) ( int .) ( )
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
price GrandesMarques V ageChamp oldvintage
Extrabrut highacidity fullbodied blancdeblanc blancdenoirs
DK SW
α ϕλ ω
φϕ η κ π
γδε
=+⋅ +⋅ +⋅




Champagnes from one of the ‘Grandes Marques’ producers, vintage champagnes, champagnes 
more than 10 years old and champagnes that are extra-brut or full-bodied are all expected to attract 
                                                 
2 Due to the total number of observations in the data set the regression analysis presented below has been performed on 
a pooled data set covering all three countries.    9
higher prices. Champagnes with high acidity have larger potential for storage, but may also be less 
attracttive for consumers who demand champagnes for immediate use. Finally, control is made for 
single variety champagnes, i.e. Blanc de Blanc’s (Chardonnay) and for Blanc de Noirs (Pinot Noirs 
and Pinot Meuniers). The signs of π and κ are not unanimous. The alternative,  blends of the 
varieties, includes the ‘secrets’ of the producers resulting in unique complex taste etc. which may 
attract some consumers. On the other hand, some consumers like the more powerful mousse or the 
prickling style of Blanc de Blanc. Furthermore, some consumers may prefer champagnes with 
aromas of fruit, dry berries, honey and the more moderate mousse which often characterizes Blanc 
de Noirs.  
 
Finally, we test a combined model using both expert ratings and objective characteristics in the 
price equation. Of course, the expert ratings reflect the characteristics of the champagnes, i.e. there 
will be a problem of multicollinarity when including both the rating and the characteristics of the 
champagnes. Therefore, the first step is to specify an equation where the ratings are regressed on the 
characteristics and by a stepwise elimination technique clarify which characteristics are important 
for the ratings (model 3). The remaining variables from model 3 are then highly correlated with the 
ratings – and thus not to be included in the final price equation, as the ratings already encapsulate 
these characteristics. Finally, model (4) represents a price equation where the sensory rating is 
included together with a vector Z of explanatory factors that were excluded from model 3 .  
 
(3) 
log( int ) ( ) ( int .) ( )
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Po s GrandesMarques V ageChamp oldvintage
Extrabrut highacidity fullbodied blancdeblanc blancdenoirs
α ϕλ ω
φϕ η κ π
ε
=+⋅ +⋅ +⋅




log( ) ( int ) price po s Z DK SW α βν γ δ ε =+⋅ + ⋅+ ⋅ +⋅ + 
 
Model (3) and model (4) are estimated using the ratings from both Robert Parker and Wine 
Spectator, and the specification of Z differs depending on which rating is included in the two-step 
estimation procedure. 
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4. Data and empirical results 
 
The main data sources are Vinmonopolet (Norway), Systembolaget (Sweden) and for Denmark the 
data are obtained from a whole range of wine merchants, supermarkets etc., as the latter is a free 
market in contrast to the state regulations of the retail sales of wine and spirits in Norway and 
Sweden. Table 2 gives summary statistics for the data used in the analysis below. In total, the data 
set includes 376 champagnes of which some of course are identical, i.e. sold on both the Danish, the 
Swedish and the Norwegian markets. About 21 per cent of the observations relate to the Danish 
market, 28 per ent to the Swedish market and the reamining 50 per cent are champagnes sold from 
the Norwegian sale outlets (Vinmonopolet). Thus, Norway is overrepresented in the data set, but the 
final data set includes all the main champagne producers and it covers reasonably well all the 
Scandinavian countries. 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of variables used in the analysis. 
                                                                                
Variable                 Number of obs.     Mean        Std Dev        Minimum     Maximum        
 
Market price (euro)             376     54.6180881     43.3674344     19.7989941    303.1329922   
Points, Wine Spectator          184     89.4130435      3.6817440     73.0000000     98.0000000   
Points, Robert Parker            55     91.3818182      2.4682496     88.0000000     98.0000000   
Points, 1855.com                128      3.9843750      0.6871644      3.0000000      5.0000000   
Grandes Marques                 376      0.4521277      0.4983661              0      1.0000000   
Dummy for vintage champagne     376      0.3989362      0.4903321              0      1.0000000   
Dummy for age gt. 10 years      376      0.0930851      0.2909388              0      1.0000000   
Dummy for extra brut            344      0.1773256      0.3825004              0      1.0000000   
Dummy for full-bodied           376      0.4654255      0.4994678              0      1.0000000   
Dummy for high acidity          376      0.0531915      0.2247142              0      1.0000000   
Dummy for Blanc de Blanc        376      0.1595745      0.3666989              0      1.0000000   
Dummy for Blanc de Noirs        376      0.0585106      0.2350192              0      1.0000000   
Dummy for the Swedish market    376      0.2819149      0.4505316              0      1.0000000   
Dummy for the Danish market     376      0.2101064      0.4079268              0      1.0000000   
 
 
Furthermore, quality assessments of professional wine experts are included in the data, i.e. ratings 
from Robert Parker, Wine Spectator and the French ‘1855 Notation’ (www.1855.com). Not all 
champagnes sold in Scandinavia have been rated by the three wine experts, who obviously only 
deal mostly with the high-end price segment of the market, as can be seen from the points. 
Accordingly, the mean value of the points given by Robert Parker, on his scale from 50-100, is 
91.4, which corresponds to being outstanding for the particular type of champagne (or wine). The 
average is a little bit lower for the champagnes rated by Wine Spectator - 89.4. However, this is 
mainly due to a few cheaper champagnes which were rated relatively low. Finally, 1855.com ends 
up with an average close to 4 points on its 0-5 points scale. Another indicator of the data set   11
representing the higher segment of the champagnes is the mean of the variable ‘Grandes Margues’, 
which is a 0-1 dummy variable, where close to half of the champagnes are Grand Margues.
3 Forty 
per cent of the champagnes included are vintage champagnes and nearly 10 per cent are more than 
10 years old. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the consumption of champagne is rather modest, i.e. a few glasses per adult 
yearly, and consequently it seems reasonable to assume that the knowledge on champagnes among 
most consumers is modest - as compared to still wines. Most likely many consumers’ choice of a 
particular bottle of champagne is based on information that is announced by the retailer and the 
most obvious information to look for is the expert ratings of the champagnes. On the other hand, 
some consumers have full information, and therefore various model specifications are tested. 
Firstly, we look at a simple model, where the consumer only has to look at sensory ratings of the 
champagnes, with results reported in subsection 4.1. In the next subsection 4.2 a hedonic price 
model is constructed assuming that the consumers try to obtain relevant information, e.g. from the 
information given on the labels – but including the expert ratings. Finally, a combined model is 
presented in subsection 4.3 following the estimation procedure explained in section 3. 
 
4.1 Explaining champagne prices by using expert ratings 
 
The first model to be tested is quite simple, cf model (1) from section 3, and with results reported in 
table 3. Except for controlling for country specific effects on prices – due to tax differences and the 
different market forms in Denmark, Norway and Sweden – the only explanatory variable is the 
points given in the expert ratings of the champagnes from Robert Parker, Wine Spectator and 
1855.com.  
 
The table clearly suggests that the ratings by the experts are significant, explanatory factors 
concerning the prices. One extra point in the Wine Spectator rating is associated with a 12% 
increase in the price, 20% for Robert Parker and only 18% for 1855.com – but note that the latter 
uses a 1-5 points scale. Looking at the R
2’s rating by Robert Parker clearly explains prices better 
than the other experts. In fact 1855.com explains only 13% of the total variation in prices. A 
possible explanation for the superior performance of Parker’s rating is that the retailers include the 
                                                 
3 The list of producers is given in Annex 1   12
valuation by Parker in their price setting, explaining the high correlation, but the ratings come from 
blind tastings and thus, the points are given exogenously in relation to the prices. 
 
Table 3. Regression analyses of the champagne prices (log values). 
Variable / Tasting expert  Wine Spectator  Robert Parker   1855.com 
Constant 













Dummy for Sweden 






Dummy for Denmark 







2  0.44 0.57 0.13 
Number of observations  179 55 128 
Notes: Values in brackets are standard errors of the estimated parameters, * indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 
the 5% level of significance. In case of Wine Spectator the sample has been limited to champagnes ranging between 80 
and 100 points in order to increase comparability with Robert Parker and 1855.com, i.e. non of the champagnes in e.g. 
Parkers rating obtain less than 80 points. Consequently, four champagnes that obtained only 73 points are excluded. If 
these observations were included, the R
2 in the Wine Spectator equation would be reduced by 10 percentage points!   
 
 
Looking at the country specific effects on prices the estimated parameters are not statistically 
significant in general, except for the negative parameter for Sweden in the 1855.com equation. Note 
however, that the dummy variable is always negative for Sweden, and there is a slight tendency that 
the dummy variable for Denmark is positive, which is a bit surprising as seen both from a tax point 
of view and from the fact that the competition on the wine market in Denmark presumably was 
expected to be more intense compared to Norway and Sweden. On the other hand – if demand for 
champagne is inelastic as noted above – pricing on market conditions will lead to higher prices in 
Denmark compared to prices set administratively by state controlled retail outlets (Norway, 
Sweden).  
 
4.2 Explaining champagne prices by objective quality attributes 
 
As an alternative to using expert ratings, prices may also be explained by quality attributes and 
other objective information available to the consumers and the retailers, e.g. information given via 
the labels. In table 4 we present the results of a series of experiments with hedonic price functions. 
A preliminary model including all variables is estimated and we use a backward elimination   13
estimation method to reduce this model in the sense that variables with insignificant parameter 
estimates (five per cent level of significance) are deleted from the model. The results are reported in 
table 4. 
 
Table 4. Hedonic regression analysis of champagne prices, using a backward elimination estimation 
method. 
Variable   Full model  Final model  Marginal contribution to 
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0.66 















2  0.57 0.57   
Number of observations  344 344   
Notes: Values in brackets are standard errors of the estimated parameters, * indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level 
of significance. In each step, explanatory variables which are not significant at the 5% level of significance are removed. The order of 
exclusion is by level of significance.  
1) Type III SS (Sum of Squares) represents the marginal contribution to the sum of squares explained by the model, when the 
particular variable is included as the last variable in the model. The variation in log(prices) explained by the model is  60.0 out of a 
total variation  on 107.4. 
 
Obviously, two explanatory variables are especially important, namely the dummy variable 
identifying whether the champagne comes from a ‘Grandes Marques’ producer and the dummy 
variable representing vintage champagnes. Both are highly significant and of a considerable size   14
and also have a significant marginal contribution to the overall fit of the model, i.e. the type III sum 
of squares (cf. the note to the table). Moreover, the estimated parameters suggest that, compared to 
the control group, a vintage champagne would be 43 per cent more expensive and according to the 
model, the price should also be 40 per cent higher if the particular champagne producer is included 
in the list of Grandes Marques. 
 
Next, if the particular vintage is more than 10 years old there also seems to be a significant higher 
price, and the marginal contribution from this variable to the total variation in the price is notable. 
As expected, champagnes which are characterised as full-bodied, are sold at higher prices (10%) 
and champagnes with high acidity - which normally results in a less soft style and more sharp taste 
when the champagne is young - cost less, suggesting that the consumers prefer champagnes that are 
ready to drink. Hence, it must be assumed that most consumers are not buying champagnes in order 
to store for later use.  
 
Control is also made for single variety champagnes, i.e. Blanc de Blanc and Blanc de Noirs (Pinot 
Noir and Pinot Meunier). The latter often gives champagnes a more complex taste, with fruit and 
aromas, but there is no significant price effect. Blanc de Blanc, which is made purely from 
Chardonnay, is typically giving more light and fresh wines with tastes of flowers and citrus, and 
with a more aggressive mousse.  On the Scandinavian market the Blanc de Blanc’s are significantly 




The model also includes dummy variables in order to reflect country-specific differences, where 
there seems to be no price differences between Norway and Sweden, but the dummy variable for 
the Danish market, which is the most liberal and competitive in Scandinavia, is positive, suggesting 
that prices on average are higher than in the neighbouring countries. This gives support to the 
hypothesis that the combination of inelastic demand and less competition on this segment of the 
wine market may result in higher prices as compared to state regulated supply where prices are set 
by administrative rules. 
                                                 
4 Champagnes made from chardonnay typically develop more slowly than Pinot based champagnes and therefore they 
are more suitable for making vintage champagnes. However, this influence is captured by the vintage dummy in the 
regression analysis.    15
Finally, it must be noted that the overall degree of explanation is 57 per cent, which is quite 
satisfactory for a model based on cross sections data. The simple models reported in table 3 do just 
as well, and the ratings by Robert Parker result in an overall performance of the same magnitude, 
which is a little bit surprising – unless the prices are influenced by the retailers knowledge about the 
expert ratings.  
 
5 Combining expert ratings and quality attributes 
 
The analysis above represents distinct alternative models to explain champagne prices. Prices are 
modelled as either a function of sensory ratings or assumed to be dependent on selected quality 
attributes. However, in the real world both sets of factors will most likely affect the price of a 
particular champagne. In case of a free market (Denmark) the retailer will surely look at - and most 
likely reveal - the points given by the experts, but also include the objective attributes of the 
champagne when setting the supply price. Similarly, on state regulated markets like Norway and 
Sweden, the sales price may also be influenced by known sensory ratings like Parker and Wine 
Spectator as well as including the objective attributes.  However, when explaining prices in a 
combined model it is important to recognize that the ratings given by the experts depend on the 
quality attributes, meaning that potential multicollinearity problems are prevalent in the estimations. 
In order to reduce the multicollinearity problem we follow the procedure explained in relation to 
model (3) and model (4) from section 3, and the results are reported in table 5.  
  
The first column concentrates on the ratings by Robert Parker, whose ratings – based on blind 
tastings – seem to capture the influence from a Grandes Marques producer, the vintage and the 
acidity. The remaining quality attributes were deleted from the model as they were found to be 
insignificant. In addition, the champagne is rewarded with more points from Robert Parker if it is a 
vintage champagne and if the acidity of the champagne is below medium. These three factors 
explain half of the variation in the Parker points. Focussing on the ratings according to Wine 
Spectator
5 - column 3 - an almost similar influence is seen from Grandes Marques and from 
‘vintage’. Additionally, older champagnes and champagnes which are full-bodied in style also help 
to obtain the Wine Spectator points. 
                                                 
5 In line with the estimations in table 3 only champagnes with at least 80 points are included in the analysis. This means 
that 4 champagnes with 73 points according to the WineSpectator rating were removed from the sample. However the 
restriction of 80 points increases the comparability with the ratings of Robert Parker, see Figure A1 and A2   16


























Points    0.1786* 
(0.0228)    0.1325* 
(0.0110) 
Grandes Marques 
1.3222**      
(0.5652)    1.4446*      
(0.3446)   
Vintage champagne 
2.9288*      
(0.5719)    2.1721* 
0.4097   
More than 10 years 
old 
  0.9339** 
(0.2181) 
1.7478* 
(0.5982)   
Brut or extra brut        
Full-bodied     0.2530** 
(0.1114) 
1.1602*        
(0.3408)   
Acidity  - high 
-1.6478**      
(0.6867)      
Blanc de Blanc        -0.1676*** 
(0.0981) 
Blanc de Noirs        
Dummy for Sweden    -0.1727 
(0.1287)    -0.0619 
(0.0761) 
Dummy for Denmark    0.0173 
(0.1312)    0.0703 
(0.0722) 
Adj. R
2  0.49 0.68  0.41  0.44 
Number of 
observations 
54 54  169  179 
Notes: Values in brackets are standard errors of the estimated parameters, * indicates significance at the 1% , ** at the 
5% and *** at the 10% level  of significance. A stepwise backward elimination estimation method has been used in the 
equations. 
Estimation of the (hedonic) price model from table 4 on the same data as used in column 2 and column 4 (table 5) 
results in R
2 values of 0.56 (54 observations with ratings by Parker) and 0.51 (173 observations with ratings by Wine 
Spectator).   
 
 
Column 2 and column 4 present the results from the estimation of the reduced price models. The 
points given by the experts are included in the model along the variables that did not significantly 
influence or explain the expert ratings. The resulting model where the Parker points appear   
includes the variables representing old and full-bodied champagnes. In the Wine Spectator model 
no other variable than the points were significant at the 5 per cent level of significance. If the latter 
is increased to a 10 per cent level of significance the Blanc de Blanc dummy is included in the 
model with a negative influence on price, which also is in accordance with the results from table 4.   17
 
Overall, the reduced price equations come up with the expected signs of the parameter estimates of 
the variables. Furthermore, the adjusted R
2–values are 10 percentage points higher in the equation 
where the Parker points are included compared to the model in table 4, and thus close to 70 per 
cent. Contrary to this, the reduced Wine Spectator equation explains only 44 per cent, which is 13 
percentage points less than the degree of explanation in the hedonic model from table 3. 
Consequently, prices seem to be more in accordance with the ratings by Robert Parker than by 
Wine Spectator.  
 
The buying advice to the less experienced consumer is therefore to note the Parker points, check-out 
whether it is an old champagne and ask the retailer (the expert) whether the champagne can be 
characterized as full-bodied. This information is highly associated with the prices of champagnes 
and ought to be included in the decision to buy a specific bottle of champagne – assuming the 
consumer’s taste is in accordance with Mr. Parker’s taste and ratings. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
The consumption of sparkling wine in the Scandinavian countries is quite modest compared to the 
consumption levels of still wines. In fact, the Scandinavians only drink a few glasses of French 
sparkling wine per year, suggesting that the average consumption of champagne is no more than a 
single glass per capita. champagne is mostly consumed on special occasions like New Years 
Evening, at receptions, or at special events within the family, like weddings, celebration of exams 
etc., and thus the elasticity of demand is most likely relatively low. Due to the low level of 
consumption, supply conditions most likely become less competitive suggesting that the prices of 
champagnes reflect cost factors, i.e. the specific quality attributes, tax differences etc. 
 
The empirical analysis presented suggests that the prices of champagnes are closely related to the 
ratings given by wine experts like Robert Parker and Wine Spectator. In the most simple model the 
analysis shows that nearly 60 per cent of the variation of the champagne prices can be explained by 
the ratings made by Robert Parker - and Wine Spectator explains about 45 per cent. Therefore, 
assuming the professional tasters can assess quality, the price structure of champagnes in   18
Scandinavia seems to be roughly correct and the easiest way for consumers to secure that a bottle of 
champagne is sold at the correct price/quality relationship is to be aware of the expert ratings, which 
are quite often announced by the retailers. 
 
As an alternative to the expert ratings a hedonic price function for champagne is estimated. This 
includes attributes like the vintage, the age, whether it is full-bodied, a single variety champagne, 
the content of acid, the dryness and finally if it originates from a Grandes Marque producer. This 
works very well and in nearly all cases the different explanatory variables are found to be 
statistically significant with the correct or expected signs of the parameter estimates. This kind of 
econometric model is able to catch the price structure of champagnes with nearly a 60 per cent 
degree of explanatory power – in fact like the wine experts. Therefore, from the objective attributes, 
i.e. the label quality, vintage, the age of the champagne, the grape used, and the acidity of the 
champagnes it is possible to predict the prices of these just as well as the best of the different rating 
systems published by the professional wine tasters. 
 
The final section of the paper combines the hedonic modelling approach and the simple sensory 
rating price model. It is demonstrated that a model where the Robert Parker rating and dummy 
variables for the age of the champagne and whether it is full-bodied explains close to 70 percent of 
the variation in the price. Moreover, when including expert ratings in the model the overall 
variation in prices is explained relatively better than in a hedonic model.     19
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Annex 1.  Grandes  Marques 
 
Grande Marque, i.e. "great brand", refers to twenty-four top champagne houses, which have been 
selected by the organization ‘Syndicat des Grandes Marques’. The list which comprises most of the 
better-known firms includes:  
 
”Ayala, Billecart-Salmon, J. Bollinger, Canard-Duchêne, Deutz, Charles Heidsieck, Heidsieck 
Monopole, Henriot, Krug, Lanson, Laurent Perrier, Mercier, Moët & Chandon, Mumm, Perrier-
Jouët, Joseph Perrier, Piper Heidseck, Pol Roger, Pommery and Greno, Louis Roederer, Ruinart, 
Salon, Taittinger and Veuve Clicquot-Ponsardin”.   21
Annex 2. Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables used in the analysis.                                   
                                                                                                 
                               Pearson Correlation Coefficients                                  
                                  Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0                                     
                                     Number of Observations                                      
                                                                                                 
              Price(euro) Points WS Points Parker Points1855   Grandemarque Vintage ch. Old champagne 
                                                                                                 
Price(euro)      1.00000   0.53042       0.66769     0.28771        0.42410    0.42675   0.47534 
Price(euro)                 <.0001        <.0001      0.0010         <.0001     <.0001    <.0001 
                     376       184            55         128            376        376       376 
                                                                                                 
PointsWS         0.53042   1.00000       0.65421     0.23743        0.11943    0.46472   0.33203 
PointsWS          <.0001                  <.0001      0.0234         0.1063     <.0001    <.0001 
                     184       184            46          91            184        184       184 
                                                                                                 
PointsParker     0.66769   0.65421       1.00000     0.17695        0.36356    0.63658   0.29981 
PointsParker      <.0001    <.0001                    0.3246         0.0064     <.0001    0.0262 
                      55        46            55          33             55         55        55 
                                                                                                 
Points1855       0.28771   0.23743       0.17695     1.00000        0.24159    0.01345   0.13530 
Points1855        0.0010    0.0234        0.3246                     0.0060     0.8802    0.1278 
                     128        91            33         128            128        128       128 
                                                                                                 
Grandemarque     0.42410   0.11943       0.36356     0.24159        1.00000    0.15475   0.11358 
Grandemarque      <.0001    0.1063        0.0064      0.0060                    0.0026    0.0277 
                     376       184            55         128            376        376       376 
                                                                                                 
Vintage ch.      0.42675   0.46472       0.63658     0.01345        0.15475    1.00000   0.39325 
                  <.0001    <.0001        <.0001      0.8802         0.0026               <.0001 
                     376       184            55         128            376        376       376 
                                                                                                 
Old champagne    0.47534   0.33203       0.29981     0.13530        0.11358    0.39325   1.00000 
                  <.0001    <.0001        0.0262      0.1278         0.0277     <.0001           
                     376       184            55         128            376        376       376 
                                                                                                 
Extra brut       0.01396   0.10418      -0.29614     0.03163       -0.10452    0.05054   0.06094 
                  0.7963    0.1726        0.0297      0.7262         0.0528     0.3500    0.2597 
                     344       173            54         125            344        344       344 
                                                                                                 
Full-bodied      0.03306   0.27436      -0.06976     0.07765       -0.08701    0.15447  -0.02367 
                  0.5227    0.0002        0.6128      0.3836         0.0920     0.0027    0.6473 
                     376       184            55         128            376        376       376 
                                                                                                 
High acidity    -0.03077   0.06821      -0.22982     0.20717        0.07042    0.04892   0.00564 
                  0.5519    0.3576        0.0914      0.0190         0.1730     0.3442    0.9132 
                     376       184            55         128            376        376       376 
                                                                                                 
Blanc de blanc  -0.09828   0.13667      -0.05962     0.04207       -0.19156    0.13443   0.06036 
                  0.0569    0.0643        0.6655      0.6373         0.0002     0.0091    0.2430 
                     376       184            55         128            376        376       376 
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Table A2 cont.                  
 
     
                                                                              
              Extra brut Full-bodied High acidity Blanc de blanc  Bl. De noirs Sweden Denmark   
                                                                                                 
 Price (euro)     0.01396    0.03306   -0.03077      -0.09828   -0.09743   -0.02595    0.16126   
 Price (euro)      0.7963     0.5227     0.5519        0.0569     0.0591     0.6159     0.0017   
                      344        376        376           376        376        376        376   
                                                                                                 
  pointsWS        0.10418    0.27436    0.06821       0.13667   -0.06669   -0.01795   -0.02006   
  pointsWS         0.1726     0.0002     0.3576        0.0643     0.3684     0.8089     0.7870   
                      173        184        184           184        184        184        184   
                                                                                                 
  pointsParker   -0.29614   -0.06976   -0.22982      -0.05962   -0.07004   -0.06726    0.26011   
  pointsParker     0.0297     0.6128     0.0914        0.6655     0.6114     0.6256     0.0551   
                       54         55         55            55         55         55         55   
                                                                                                 
  points1855      0.03163    0.07765    0.20717       0.04207   -0.05431   -0.09226    0.15390   
  points1855       0.7262     0.3836     0.0190        0.6373     0.5426     0.3003     0.0828   
                      125        128        128           128        128        128        128   
                                                                                                 
  grandemarque   -0.10452   -0.08701    0.07042      -0.19156   -0.15816    0.02464    0.18734   
  grandemarque     0.0528     0.0920     0.1730        0.0002     0.0021     0.6339     0.0003   
                      344        376        376           376        376        376        376   
                                                                                                 
  Vintage ch.      0.05054    0.15447    0.04892       0.13443   -0.15681    0.02068    0.03312   
                   0.3500     0.0027     0.3442        0.0091     0.0023     0.6894     0.5220   
                      344        376        376           376        376        376        376   
                                                                                                 
  Old champagne   0.06094   -0.02367    0.00564       0.06036   -0.07987   -0.01764   -0.00795   
                   0.2597     0.6473     0.9132        0.2430     0.1221     0.7332     0.8779   
                      344        376        376           376        376        376        376   
                                                                                                 
  sweet_d         1.00000    0.19137    0.12097       0.10897    0.07980   -0.16265   -0.06378   
                              0.0004     0.0248        0.0434     0.1397     0.0025     0.2380   
                      344        344        344           344        344        344        344   
                                                                                                 
  Full-bodied     0.19137    1.00000    0.11147       0.20492    0.10815   -0.39504   -0.04932   
                   0.0004                0.0307        <.0001     0.0361     <.0001     0.3402   
                      344        376        376           376        376        376        376   
                                                                                                 
  High acidity    0.12097    0.11147    1.00000       0.02616   -0.00859   -0.06949   -0.03497   
                   0.0248     0.0307                   0.6130     0.8681     0.1787     0.4990   
                      344        376        376           376        376        376        376   
                                                                                                 
Blanc de blanc    0.10897    0.20492    0.02616       1.00000   -0.10863   -0.22460    0.02484   
                   0.0434     <.0001     0.6130                   0.0352     <.0001     0.6311   
                      344        376        376           376        376        376        376   
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Table A2 cont.                                                                              
                                                                                                 
                                                                 
                                                                                                 
              Price (euro)  pointsWS  pointsParker  points1855  grandemarque  Vintage    Old ch. 
                                                                                                 
Blanc de noirs  -0.09743  -0.06669      -0.07004    -0.05431       -0.15816   -0.15681  -0.07987 
                  0.0591    0.3684        0.6114      0.5426         0.0021     0.0023    0.1221 
                     376       184            55         128            376        376       376 
                                                                                                 
Sweden          -0.02595  -0.01795      -0.06726    -0.09226        0.02464    0.02068  -0.01764 
                  0.6159    0.8089        0.6256      0.3003         0.6339     0.6894    0.7332 
                     376       184            55         128            376        376       376 
                                                                                                 
Denmark          0.16126  -0.02006       0.26011     0.15390        0.18734    0.03312  -0.00795 
                  0.0017    0.7870        0.0551      0.0828         0.0003     0.5220    0.8779 
                     376       184            55         128            376        376       376 
                                  
                                                                                                 
                      
                             chardonnay_                                    
              Extra brut Full bodied High acidity Blanc de blanc Bl.de noirs Sweden Denmark   
                                                                                                 
  Blanc de noirs  0.07980    0.10815   -0.00859      -0.10863    1.00000   -0.15620   -0.12857   
                   0.1397     0.0361     0.8681        0.0352                0.0024     0.0126   
                      344        376        376           376        376        376        376   
                                                                                                 
  Sweden         -0.16265   -0.39504   -0.06949      -0.22460   -0.15620    1.00000   -0.32315   
                   0.0025     <.0001     0.1787        <.0001     0.0024                <.0001   
                      344        376        376           376        376        376        376   
                                                                                                 
  Denmark        -0.06378   -0.04932   -0.03497       0.02484   -0.12857   -0.32315    1.00000   
                   0.2380     0.3402     0.4990        0.6311     0.0126     <.0001              
                      344        376        376           376        376        376        376   
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Annex 3. Plots of prices versus the expert ratings 
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